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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION AS COMPLEMENTARY 





Este artigo testa a proposição da teoria econômica de que propriedade intelectual e defesa 
da concorrência são políticas complementares. Um modelo probit ordenado é utilizado para 
estimar os efeitos marginais do uso e qualidade do enforcement dos direitos de propriedade 
intelectual em uma medida da gravidade dos problemas relacionados à concorrência. Os 
resultados obtidos reforçam a noção de que as políticas de concorrência e propriedade intelectual 
não são contraditórias. 
PALAVRAS CHAVES: Defesa da concorrência, propriedade intelectual, modelos probit 
ordenado 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper tests the proposition that intellectual property rights and competition policy are 
complementary policies. An ordered probit model is applied to a sample of over 4,000 firms in 36 
countries in order to estimate the marginal effects of the use and quality of enforcement of 
intellectual property rights on a measure of the degree of seriousness of competition problems. 
The results obtained reinforce the notion that competition and IP are not contradictory policies. 
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I In nt tr ro od du uc ct ti io on n
1 1   
Economic theory suggests that intellectual property rights and competition policy are 
complementary policies. The objective of this paper is to test this proposition by applying an 
ordered-probit model to a sample of over 4,000 firms in 36 countries.  
The paper is divided in two sections. Section 1 contains a brief theoretical discussion of 
the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and competition policy as 
interdependent and complementary tools. Section 2 contains a test of such theoretical expectation 
using an ordered probit model. 
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, it contains a measure of the degree of 
seriousness of competition problems as well as a measure of the degree of implementation of 
IPR. Second, it offers a test of the relationship between the variables while controlling for a 
number of relevant characteristics. Third, the results obtained reinforce the notion that 
competition and IP authorities should cooperate.  
1 1    I In nt te el ll le ec ct tu ua al l    P Pr ro op pe er rt ty y    a an nd d    C Co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n    a as s    C Co om mp pl le em me en nt ta ar ry y    P Po ol li ic ci ie es s: :    t th he e   
T Th he eo or re et ti ic ca al l   A Ar rg gu um me en nt t   
Intellectual property rights and competition policy share a common objective, namely to 
protect competitive markets so that they generate economic efficiency and welfare. There is no 
clear trade off between competition and innovation, and therefore the two policies must not be 
seen as contradictory.   
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a section of a report prepared for the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
project on Intellectual Property and Competition Law. Earlier versions were discussed at the Center for the Brazilian 
Studies at Columbia University, the Regulation, Competition and Trade Group at Fundação Getúlio Vargas in São 
Paulo, Brazil and at the Instituto Tendências in São Paulo, Brazil. We thank the numerous suggestions and 
comments, and especially Mario Margarido, Eduardo Machado, Frederico Turolla and Cinthia Konichi. Revision of 
the text by Jessica Gillota is gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveats apply.  
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1.1  The scopes of competition policy and intellectual property rights 
Competition policy is a set of tools used by the state in order to protect and promote the 
process of competition, with the aim at achieving allocative efficiency. When competition is 
absent, market power is exercised and the equilibrium price obtained is at a level above marginal 
cost. This creates allocative inefficiency. 
Competition is also regarded as an important source of productive efficiency (x-
efficiency), which occurs when firms produce the maximum output possible from a given amount 
of inputs, and dynamic efficiency, which occurs when society takes full benefit of innovations 
that are economically viable. 
Intellectual property (henceforth IP) allocates exclusive rights (intellectual property rights, 
or IPRs) for creators, innovators and artists. As the cost of reproducing ideas and innovations 
tends to be low and sometimes close to zero, IPRs encourage further innovation by enabling its 
owners to be rewarded for its use. This reward can occur in two ways: by the economic profits 
the innovator can obtain by being the sole user of the invention and/or by licensing the IPR and 
receiving royalties for its use. 
As the objective of IP is to induce innovations that will ultimately provide better 
conditions for price, quality and diversity of products available to consumers, it possesses the 
same final goal as competition policy, which is to promote welfare.
2 
1.2   Is there a conflict between competition policy and intellectual property? 
At first glance, one would think that there would exist an inherent conflict between 
intellectual property rights and competition policy. However, for this to be accurate, two 
conditions must hold:  
i.  There must exist a trade off between competition (or short run allocative efficiency) 
and innovation (or long run dynamic efficiency). 
                                                 
2 The concept of economic welfare varies among jurisdictions. In some countries total welfare including both 
consumer´s and producer´s welfare is considered. In others, only consumer´s welfare is taken into consideration.  
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ii.  Since IP induces innovation by granting market power to innovators and competition 
policy aims at restricting the use of market power, the policy objectives may be 
contradictory at some point in time. 
1.2.1  Does market power induce innovation?   
The idea that market power is necessary for R&D investment and innovation dates back to 
the work of Joseph A. Schumpeter in the 1940s.
3 There are two reasons why market power 
should induce innovation. First, monopoly profits may be an important form of financing R&D 
projects. Second, market power generates the profits necessary for the appropriation of R&D 
investments. 
Scherer and Ross (1990) point out that the theoretical literature on the first condition does 
not lead to a single conclusion. Henceforth, the importance of monopoly profits in R&D 
financing is mainly an empirical question. Unfortunately, as Scherer and Ross (1990) also note, 
this is a difficult hypothesis to test, since it is hard to establish what the time lag between profits 
and R&D investments is and to exclude both the feedback from innovation to profits and other 
variables that affect both innovation and profits, such as demand changes. 
It must also be noted that, for the first assertion to be true, other forms of R&D financing 
such as credit markets and government grant programs must not be available. There is no a priori 
reason to suppose that this is true. In conclusion, the theory that monopoly profits are necessary 
for R&D financing is not sound or robust enough to serve as a basis for public policy decisions. 
On the other hand, there is extensive literature exploring the relationship between market 
structure and innovation.
4  Most of this literature focuses on the effect of market structure on 
innovation (not considering the effect that innovations can have in forging market structures 
                                                 
3 Schumpeter (1942) is the main reference.  
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variables such as concentration and entry barriers). However, this literature presents ambiguous 
results.
5  
However, one of the most robust conclusions of this literature can be presented in a 
simple model that demonstrates the interaction between the two main effects of competition on 
innovation
6:  
•  Firms under stronger competitive pressure innovate rapidly in order to be the first with the 
new product; and 
•  The existence of more rivals split the potential benefits into more parts. 
The model considers innovation as the speed of new products (or productive processes) 
development. It is assumed that, the faster a new product is developed, the higher R&D costs. 
Although this is somewhat intuitive, Scherer and Ross (1990) present reasons justifying this 
assumption. Hence, there exists a cost-time tradeoff in the development of new products that is 
presented as the CC’ curve in Chart 1.  
Also, the longer the time that it takes for a new product to be introduced into the market, 
the smaller is the present value of the firm’s profits with this product. This profit-time tradeoff is 
presented for the case of a monopolist (which is, in this model, a firm that only considers the 






                                                 
5 Scherer and Ross (1990) point out that “through an astute choice of assumptions, virtually any market structure can 
be shown to have superior innovative qualities”.  
6 Viscusi et alli (1995).   
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Source: Adapted from Viscusi et alli (1995) 
Let T1 be the optimal time that the monopolist represented in Chart 1 will take to develop 
the new product. T1 is the time where the distance between V1 and CC’ is the greatest, that is, 
where the expected profit is maximized
7. 
Now, suppose that there is another firm considering the development of this new product. 
This competitor faces the same cost-time tradeoff (that is, the same curve CC’). However, the 
profit-time tradeoff is affected by the presence of competition, being now represented as V2 in 
Chart 2. This new curve must be lower and steeper than V1, since, respectively, the total market 
potential profit must now be split between two firms and the payoff of innovating early is higher 
(the earlier the first firm innovates to develop its product, the longer it will be able to reap 
                                                 
7 Geometrically, this is the point where the two curves have the same slope.  
 
 
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 152   •   SETEMBRO DE 2006   •   9 
 
monopoly profits). Furthermore, as the number of rivals increase, the profit-time tradeoff curve 
becomes lower and steeper. Hence, Chart 2 demonstrates the curve representing the tradeoff 
when there are ten rivals (V10). 












Source: Adapted from Viscusi et alli (1995) 
Two conclusions can be drawn from Chart 2. First, innovation occurs faster in a duopoly 
than in a monopoly (or T2<T1). This is due to the fact that competition creates the incentive to be 
the first to innovate. Second, there are cases where the number of rivals is so large that any R&D 
investment is unprofitable, and no innovation occurs; or in terms of Chart 2, the curve V10 is 
beneath CC’, implying that the expected profits are smaller than any expected cost of innovating. 
As the number of rivals presented are merely representative and can be understood 
broadly as a proxy for the intensity of competition in the model, one can conclude that some 
degree of competition is necessary to spur faster innovation, but, there can be cases where too 
much competition makes innovation unprofitable.   
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The model above considers competition in R&D itself, as multiple firms consider the 
development of a new product. However, if only a single firm is able to engage in some 
innovation, then being in a more competitive market only has a positive effect on innovation.  
Suppose a monopolist produces at cost ca and obtains a profit equal to A. The company 
has the choice of sum F in R&D and then to produce at a lower cost cb, which allows it to earn a 
higher profit B. This monopolist will only engage in innovation if the difference between B and 
A is higher than F (that is, the investment is profitable).  
Now consider a firm with the same cost structure under perfect competition. If this firm 
spends F in R&D and starts to produce at cost cb, it will be able to supply to the whole market 
and earn a profit of B earning thus a profit of zero. This firm would innovate if B
8 is higher than 
F. As B is obviously higher than the difference of B and A, the firm under competitive pressure 
has a higher incentive to innovate and, in the cases where F lies between A and B, only the firm 
under competition would choose to invest. This is the so-called Arrow’s replacement effect, due 
to the fact that, while a firm under competition replaces its competitors when it innovates, a 
monopolist replaces itself. 
There is a large body of empirical literature on the effects of market structure and 
competition on innovation
9. In general, this empirical literature concludes, through the analysis of 
industry-level data from developed countries, that the effect of concentration on R&D and 
innovation follows an “inverted U” shape, that is, too little competition or too much competition 
hinders innovation. Also, the analysis of firm-level data for the United States and United 
Kingdom points that larger firms are not more prone to engage in innovation, thus not supporting 
the Schumpeterian view of the monopoly-innovation relationship. 
Taking this large theoretical and empirical literature into account, Scherer and Ross 
(1990) stated that:  
                                                 
8 This requires the assumption that the cost reduction is large enough to make a monopoly price under cost cb lower 
than ca (the price that the innovator’s competitor can supply the product). However, the main results hold without this 
assumption. See Motta (2004), which serves as a basis of the argument presented, for more details. 
9 See, for instance, Cohen and Levin (1989).  
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“Schumpeter was right in asserting that perfect competition has no title to 
being established as the model of dynamic efficiency. But his less cautious 
followers were wrong when they implied that powerful monopolies and tightly knit 
cartels had any stronger claim to the title. What is needed for technical progress is 
a subtle blend of competition and monopoly, with more emphasis in general on the 
former than the latter.” (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 670) 
However, as noted by Motta (2004), it is almost impossible to use the results above in 
competition policy and/or intellectual property rights issues. The “optimal competition for 
innovation” in any market depends on an enormous array of parameters and variables that cannot 
be directly observed by policymakers.  
In this sense, Motta (2004) advises against any policy trying to introduce the “right” level 
of competition in any market. This author also underlines the fact that that reducing the level of 
competition in a given industry in order to reach a theoretically optimal level of innovation is 
“not justified by any robust theory”.  
Thus, the theoretical and empirical literature does not support the existence of a clear 
tradeoff between competition and innovation. It is more likely that both competition and a certain 
amount of market power are necessary to spur the development of new products and processes.  
1.2.2  Does intellectual property grant market power? 
This subsection addresses the second condition, which states that IPRs convey market 
power to innovators, thus promoting the very phenomenon that antitrust aims at deterring. 
The misleading part of this is not in its internal logic, but on the way it presents the 
objective of competition policy and the mechanisms through which IP policy induces innovation.  
First, it must be noted that IPRs do not necessarily create or enhance market power. This 
view is almost consensual in both academia and public policy
10. The product or production 
                                                 
10 This view was largely supported in an OECD Roundtable on IP and antitrust.  
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process which is protected by the IPR may have substitutes which remain unprotected. In the 
jargon of antitrust analysis, IPRs grant powers over specific products, and not whole relevant 
markets. In most cases, it is expected that the product under IPR protection is only a fraction of 
this relevant market.
11 Moreover, IPRs usually contain mechanisms which enable the possibility 
of a competitor as in the case of compulsory licensing.  
Second, “restricting the use of market power” would not be an accurate description of 
competition policy. One of the basic tenets of antitrust is that market power is not, by itself, 
illegal. Some degree of market power is necessary for the occurrence of other efficiency 
enhancing phenomena such as economies of scale and scope, synergies, transaction costs 
economies and, also, innovation
12. The problem is the abusive use of this market power. 
Thus, it is clear that: i) it is misleading to assume that IPRs necessarily create or enhance 
market power; and ii) challenging the possible market power granted by an IPR is not an 
objective of competition policy. Hence, it would be more adequate to think of both policies not as 
contradictory, but as complementary. 
There are two recommendations on how IP authorities should address anticompetitive 
issues. First, including a rigorous assessment of competition issues on the analysis of IPR filings 
would probably generate more costs than benefits. Second, allowing for post-grant reviews and 
opposition by third parties and government bodies can diminish the cases which an IPR enables 
anticompetitive practices.  
Evidence from seven selected countries suggest two facts
13. First, there is no uniformity in 
stating specific provisions for IPR-related anticompetitive conduct or for exemption mechanisms 
for IPR owners. Second, the fact that most antitrust legislations include innovation as an 
important issue to be taken into account in merger review points out that: i) dynamic efficiency is 
                                                 
11 A relevant market is the smallest group of products and geographical area in which it is plausible to assume the 
exercise of market power.  
12 See Gallini and Trebilcock (1998). 
13 This evidence is contained in a forthcoming study of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The 
selected countries are USA, Brazil, India, South Africa, Mexico, United Kingdom and Canada.  
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a goal of competition policy, and ii) the possibility of applying the innovation markets approach 
is present in most countries. 
2 2    I In nt te el ll le ec ct tu ua al l    P Pr ro op pe er rt ty y    a an nd d    C Co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n    a as s    C Co om mp pl le em me en nt ta ar ry y    P Po ol li ic ci ie es s: :    t th he e   
e em mp pi ir ri ic ca al l   e ev vi id de en nc ce e   
The objective of this section is to empirically assess the relationship between competition 
and the use of the intellectual property system using national data.  
2.1  Data on National Competition and use of IP systems 
Obtaining data that provides a meaningful and comparable measure of competition at the 
national level is not trivial. The precise measure of market power predicted by economic theory 
(the difference between prices and marginal costs) is difficult to observe in practice.
14   
This work utilizes a sample of over 4,000 firms in 36 countries taken from the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in 1999-2000.
15 The survey 
asked qualitative questions about the environment in which these firms operate. Of the several 
questions asked, two were of major interest for the present analysis:  
•  “Please judge on a four point scale how problematic are the following factors for the 
operation and growth of your business:  
[…] anti-competitive practices by government or private enterprises”. 
•  “Please judge on a four point scale how serious a problem are the following practices of 
your competitors for your firm: 
[…] they violate my copyrights, patents or trademarks.” 
                                                 
14 Economic literature usually applies methods that avoid measuring marginal cost, even when the researcher is 
studying a single market and possesses detailed data. An introduction to this subject can be found in Church and 
Ware (2002). 
15 The survey interviewed over 10,000 firms in 81 countries. However, due to the fact that information on IP is not 
available for some countries and that there are several cases of missing data (due to questions that the surveyed firms 
have not answered) on the WBES, only 4,315 observations could actually be used. Annex 1 presents the list of the 36 
countries in our sample.  
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The four points are “1- No obstacle, 2 – Minor Obstacle, 3 – Moderate Obstacle, 4 – 
Major Obstacle”. 
The answers to the first question are a meaningful and comparable measure of the (lack 
of) quality of the competitive environment of a given country. This variable (henceforth 
anticompetitive practice index - API) measures, on a discrete scale from 1 to 4, how troublesome 
anticompetitive practices are for a given firm. A comparable measure of market power, if 
available, would not be so relevant to this study, since, as discussed in Section 1, antitrust aims 
not at fighting market power per se, but practices that extend, obtain or maintain it. 
The answer to the second question can measure a quality attribute of intellectual property 
systems: how (un)able they are to enforce the rights they are granted. Henceforth we will refer to 
this variable as the IP violation index - IPVI. By taking the average of the firms’ answers within a 
country, one can calculate both the API and the IPVI at the national level. 
Two other measures of the use of intellectual property are also used. The number of 
patents and trademarks granted in 1999 in the firm’s country (measured in patents/trademarks per 
thousand people).
16 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is the source for this 
data.  
For an introduction to the relationship between the three IP variables and the API, Chart 3 
presents the average number of patents, trademarks, and the IPVI by quintile of the 






                                                 
16 Data on population is from the Penn World Tables – Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002).  
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Chart 3: Average IPR Enforcement Index, by Anticompetitive Practice Index Quintile 
 
        Source: Own elaboration from WIPO and World Bank data. 
Chart 3 suggests that anticompetitive practices are not a significant obstacle to firms in 
countries with more use of patent and trademark systems. Also, the significance of IP violations 
as a concern to firms’ business is positively correlated with the significance of anticompetitive 
practices. 
Note, however, that the relationship between the API and the IP variables does not seem 
to be monotonic. In the cases of patents and the violations index, there seems to be an “inverted-
U shaped” effect, while the trademarks present a “U-shaped” relationship with the API. 
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2.2  The empirical strategy 
Since the API is a discrete variable, the empirical strategy is to estimate an ordered probit 
model for the firm responses to the API question. Basically, it is assumed that there is a 
theoretical latent variable Yi
*
 that is continuous, given by: 
Yi
*=Xiβ+ei       (1) 
Where Xi is a 1xK vector of variables for firm i, β is a Kx1 vector of unknown parameters 
and ei is a random term with standard normal distribution. The Yi
* variable defines the answer to 









Since the αs are also parameters to be estimated, jointly with the βs, by maximum 
likelihood, it is possible to infer the marginal effect of independent variables on the firms’ answer 
without assuming that the API has a cardinal interpretation.
17 
The K variables included in the Xi vector are: 
o  patents, trademarks are the natural logarithms of the number of patents/trademarks 
granted per thousand people in the country where the firm operates. The squares of these 
variables are also included, searching for possible nonlinear relationships. 
o  violations,  which is the intellectual property violations index described in 
Subsection 3.1. The average of answers within a country is used in order to avoid endogeneity 
problems. Again, the square of the variables is also included. 
                                                 
17 See Wooldridge (2002) for the derivation of the maximum likelihood function, and also for the formulae for 
calculating the marginal effects. Stata (Version 9) software was used in all the estimations (and marginal effect 
computations) in this paper.  
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•  gdp: the natural logarithm of the PPP-adjusted per capita gross domestic product 
in the country where the firm operates, from the Penn World Tables database; 
•  qcgov, qparl and qcourt are variables from the WBES that reflect, on a continuous 
scale of 1 to 4, the quality of the central government, parliament, and courts, respectively. As in 
the case of violations, the average of answers within a country is used. 
•  Six dummy variables from the WBES, assigning a value of one if the firm is in the 
manufacturing sector (manuf), has a large domestic firm or an international multinational as its 
main competitor (bigcomp), has a state owned company as its main competitor (statecomp), does 
not have any competitors (monopolist), is state owned (stateown), and exports its output 
(exports). 
The inclusion of the control variables allows one to observe the effect of the IPR system 
use/quality holding the level of economic development (per capita GDP) and the quality of 
institutions (central government, courts and parliament) fixed. This is important since it is 
expected that more developed countries present both stronger IPR and competition policy, and 
the correlation between these two variables may be entirely due to the effect of economic and 
institutional development. Chart 4 presents descriptive statistics of the data. 
Chart 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Variable Unit  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
antcomp 1-4  scale  2.316 1.122  1  4 
patents  patents per 
1,000 people  0.102  0.109 0.002 0.562 
trademarks  trademarks per 
1,000 people  0.883  0.820 0.132 3.627 
violations 1-4  scale  2.391  0.441 1.388 3.134 
gdp  PPP-adjusted 
US$ thousands  10.635 7.353  1.801  33.726 
qcgov 1-4  scale  3.696  0.601 2.721 4.835 
qcourt 1-4  scale  3.748  0.348 2.549 4.407 
qparl  1-4  scale  4.002  0.485 2.758 4.790 
manuf Dummy  Variable  0.110  0.313  0  1 
bigcomp Dummy  Variable  0.177  0.382  0  1 
statecomp Dummy  Variable  0.026  0.160  0  1  
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monopolist Dummy  Variable  0.014  0.118  0  1 
stateown Dummy  Variable  0.151  0.358  0  1 
exports Dummy  Variable 0.315  0.465  0  1 
      Source: Own elaboration from WIPO and World Bank data. 
2.3 Results 
As the coefficients (βs) from the ordered probit model can only be interpreted as the 
marginal effect of a variable on the latent variable Y
*, and not on the variable of interest (the 
API), Chart 5 directly reports the marginal effects (measured at the average point of the sample) 
of the variables on the probability of a firm answering a specific level of API.
18  
These marginal effects are based on a model that excludes non-significant (at the 10% 
level) control variables. However, Annex 2 presents the results based on the unrestricted model, 
demonstrating that the main results are robust to the exclusion of non-significant variables.
19 
Chart 5: Marginal Effects from the Ordered Probit Model 
Prob(API=1) Prob(API=2)  Prob(API=3)  Prob(API=4) 
Variable  Mg. Eff.  (P-Val.)  Mg. Eff.  (P-Val.)  Mg. Eff.  (P-Val.)  Mg. Eff.  (P-Val.) 
patents 0.082  (0.004)  0.009 (0.006)  -0.028 (0.004) -0.063  (0.004) 
patents
2  0.010 (0.005)  0.001 (0.008)  -0.003 (0.006)  -0.008 (0.005) 
trademarks 0.025  (0.025)  0.003 (0.030)  -0.008 (0.025) -0.019  (0.025) 
trademarks
2  -0.010 (0.166)  -0.001 (0.172) 0.003  (0.167) 0.008  (0.166) 
violations -0.639  (0.000)  -0.070  (0.000) 0.215  (0.000) 0.494  (0.000) 
violations
2  0.115 (0.000)  0.013 (0.001)  -0.039 (0.000)  -0.089 (0.000) 
gdp  0.025 (0.098)  0.003 (0.105)  -0.008 (0.098)  -0.019 (0.098) 
qcgov    -0.051 (0.000)  -0.006 (0.001) 0.017  (0.000) 0.040  (0.000) 
bigcomp  -0.057 (0.000)  -0.009 (0.004) 0.018  (0.000) 0.047  (0.000) 
statecomp -0.078  (0.017) -0.015  (0.110)  0.023  (0.004) 0.070  (0.040) 
monopolist 0.119  (0.043)  0.000 (0.972)  -0.044 (0.057) -0.075  (0.012) 
stateown 0.053  (0.003)  0.004 (0.000)  -0.018 (0.004) -0.038  (0.001) 
   Source: Own elaboration from WIPO and World Bank data. 
 
                                                 
18 The estimated coefficients are available in Annex 2. 
19 The results are also robust to the exclusion of the square of trademarks, which is also nonsignificant.  
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Each column of Chart 5 presents the magnitude of the effect of a marginal increase in the 
independent variables on the probability of the API assuming a given value. The P-Value of the 
marginal effect, taken from the comparison of a Z-statistic with standard normal distribution, is 
shown in parenthesis. 
In general, Chart 5 indicates that both the more frequent use and stronger enforcement of 
IP have a negative effect on API (i.e., improves the competitive environment).  
A more frequent use of the patent system is associated with a higher probability of 
answering that anticompetitive practices are “no obstacle” or “minor obstacle” to the firm’s 
operation, while it lowers the probability of answering “moderate obstacle” or “major obstacle”. 
The fact that the square of patents is associated with lower API indicates that the marginal effect 
of a granted patent granted is larger in countries where there already is ample use of the IP 
system.  
The presence of trademarks is also associated with smaller API. The results point that a 
1% increase in the number of trademarks granted raises the probability of a firm answering “no 
obstacle” in 2.5 p.p., while it decreases the probability of answering “major obstacle” in 1.9 p.p. 
Although the marginal effects are not large, the result is statistically significant. Also note that 
the coefficient on the square of trademarks is not significant (at the 10% level). 
At first glance, it would seem that the IP violations index has an “inverted-U shaped” 
effect on the probability of a firm answering “no obstacle” o “minor obstacle”, and a “U shaped” 
effect on the probability of a “moderate” or “major” answer. However, it must be noted that in all 
cases, the inflection point (the top or bottom of the “U”) is at a number higher than four, which is 
the maximum value of the IPVI. Hence, an increase in violations raises the probability of a firm 
answering “moderate” or “major” and lowers the probability of a “no obstacle” or “minor” 
answer.  
The marginal effects of firm-specific controls reveal the expected signs: firms that are 
state-owned and/or monopolists are less prone to have problems with anticompetitive practices, 
while the opposite occurs with firms that have large companies, multinationals or state  
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enterprises as their main competitors. Economic development, measured by the per capita GDP, 
is also associated with smaller API. The only counter-intuitive result is the fact that the quality of 
central government has a positive effect on the API. 
As a robustness check, a linear probability model (LPM), which consists of an OLS 
regression of the API against the dependent variables, was also estimated. Although this model 
imposes a cardinal interpretation of the API, it does not require that the random term ei in 
Equation (1) has a standard normal distribution. The sign and significance of the marginal effects 
inferred from the LPM were exactly the same as the ones observed in the ordered probit model.
20 
3 3    C Co on nc cl lu us si io on n   
In conclusion, the results show that a more frequent use and stronger enforcement of the 
patent and trademark systems reduce  the probability of anticompetitive practices. These results 
confirm the theoretical proposition that IP and antitrust are complementary, not contradictory 
policies. 
The common objective and the complementary nature of the two policy areas may 
strengthen the case for a closer cooperation between competition and IP agencies. 
  
                                                 
20 Annex 2 reports the estimation of the LPM.  
 
 
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 152   •   SETEMBRO DE 2006   •   21 
 
R Re ef fe er re en nc ce es s   
CHURCH, J. and WARE, R. Industrial Organization: a strategic approach. 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 1999. 
GALLINI, N. T. and TREBILCOCK, M.J. Intellectual Property Rights and Competition 
Policy: A Framework for the Analysis of Economic and Legal Issues. In: ANDERSON, R.D. and 
GALLINI, N.T. Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy, Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1998. 
HESTON, A., SUMMERS, R. and ATEN, B. Penn World Tables Version 6.1. Center of 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania: 2002. 
LEVIN, R. and COHEN, W. Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure. In: 
SCHMALENSEE, R. and WILLIG, R. The Handbook of Industrial Organization. Elsevier, 1989. 
MOTTA, M. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
OECD – ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT. Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights. OECD Journal of 
Competition Law and Policy, vol. 3, n. 2, August 2001.  
REINEGAUM, J. F. The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development and Diffusion. 
In: SCHMALENSSE, R. and WILLIG, R. The Handbook of Industrial Organization. Elsevier, 
1989. 
SCHERER, F.M. and ROSS, D. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990. 
SCHUMPETER, J. A. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Harper & Brothers, 1942 
[original edition].  
VISCUSI, W. K., VERNON, J. M. and HARRINGTON, J. E. The Economics of 
Regulation and Antitrust. The MIT Press, 1995.   
 
 
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 152   •   SETEMBRO DE 2006   •   22 
 
WHITE, H. A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for 
Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, vol. 48, n. 3, 1980.  





TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 152   •   SETEMBRO DE 2006   •   23 
 
A An nn ne ex x   1 1: :   L Li is st t   o of f   C Co ou un nt tr ri ie es s   A An na al ly yz ze ed d   i in n   S Se ec ct ti io on n   3 3   
Chart A1: Countries in the Sample Analyzed in Subsection 3.2 
Country 
Number of Firms in 
the Sample 
Part. (%) in the 
Sample 
Argentina 95 2.2 
Armenia 110 2.55 
Belarus 108 2.5 
Bulgaria 106 2.46 
Canada 99 2.29 
Colombia 97 2.25 
Croatia 119 2.76 
Czech Republic  113 2.62 
Ecuador 74 1.71 
Estonia 120 2.78 
France 96 2.22 
Georgia 124 2.87 
Germany 97 2.25 
Guatemala 101 2.34 
Honduras 90 2.09 
Hungary 112 2.6 
Italy 88 2.04 
Kazakhstan 99 2.29 
Kyrgyzstan 93 2.16 
Lithuania 95 2.2 
Mexico 99 2.29 
Moldova 107 2.48 
Nicaragua 97 2.25 
Poland 214 4.96 
Portugal 97 2.25 
Romania 107 2.48 
Russia 472 10.94 
Slovak Republic  123 2.85 
Slovenia 123 2.85 
Spain 98 2.27 
Sweden 98 2.27 
Turkey 145 3.36 
Ukraine 211 4.89 
United Kingdom  100 2.32 
United States  94 2.18 
Uruguay 94 2.18 
Total 4,315 100 
Source: Own elaboration from WIPO and World Bank data  
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A An nn ne ex x   2 2: :   R Ro ob bu us st tn ne es ss s   C Ch he ec ck ks s   o on n   t th he e   S St ta at ti is st ti ic ca al l   A An na al ly ys si is s   o of f   t th he e   I Im mp pa ac ct t   o of f   I IP P   
o on n   C Co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n   
This annex presents some robustness checks on the results presented in Subsection 2.3. 
First, Chart A2 reports the marginal effects obtained from an unrestricted ordered probit model, 
which includes three non-significant control variables (manuf, exports, and qparl and qcourt). 
Chart A2: Marginal Effects from the Unrestricted Ordered Probit Model 
Prob(API=1) Prob(API=2) Prob(API=3) Prob(API=4) 
Variable  Mg.  Eff. P-Val. Mg.  Eff. P-Val. Mg.  Eff. P-Val. Mg.  Eff. P-Val. 
patents 0.065  (0.034)  0.007 (0.040)  -0.022 (0.035) -0.050  (0.034) 
patents
2  0.009 (0.023)  0.001 (0.028)  -0.003 (0.023)  -0.007 (0.023) 
trademarks 0.024  (0.034)  0.003 (0.040)  -0.008 (0.035) -0.019  (0.034) 
trademarks
2  -0.012 (0.121)  -0.001 (0.128) 0.004  (0.122) 0.009  (0.121) 
violations -0.586  (0.000)  -0.064  (0.000) 0.197  (0.000) 0.453  (0.000) 
violations
2  0.104 (0.001)  0.011 (0.002)  -0.035 (0.001)  -0.080 (0.001) 
gdp  0.031 (0.050)  0.003 (0.057)  -0.010 (0.051)  -0.024 (0.050) 
qcgov  -0.053 (0.015)  -0.006 (0.020) 0.018  (0.016) 0.041  (0.015) 
qcourt  -0.048 (0.089)  -0.005 (0.095) 0.016  (0.090) 0.037  (0.089) 
qparl 0.020  (0.519)  0.002  (0.520) -0.007  (0.519) -0.016  (0.519) 
manuf  -0.021 (0.275)  -0.003 (0.344) 0.007  (0.264) 0.017  (0.291) 
bigcomp  -0.060 (0.000)  -0.009 (0.003) 0.019  (0.000) 0.050  (0.000) 
statecomp -0.079  (0.015) -0.016  (0.104)  0.023  (0.003) 0.071  (0.036) 
monopolist 0.116  (0.049) 0.000 (0.991)  -0.043 (0.063) -0.073  (0.015) 
stateown 0.051  (0.004)  0.004 (0.000)  -0.018 (0.006) -0.037  (0.002) 
exports 0.012  (0.385)  0.001 (0.367)  -0.004 (0.388) -0.009  (0.382) 
Source: Own elaboration from WIPO and World Bank data. 
Second, a linear probability model (LPM) is estimated by regressing the API against the 
independent variables. Although this model assumes that the API has a cardinal interpretation, it 
does not imposes some of the distributional assumptions of the ordered probit model.
21 The 
White (1980) variance-covariance matrix is used to compute standard errors that are robust to the 
heteroskedasticity problems usually associated with models with discrete dependent variables.  
Chart A3 presents the result from the LPM estimation. 
                                                 
21 See Wooldridge (2001) for more on this subject.  
 
 
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 152   •   SETEMBRO DE 2006   •   25 
 
Chart A3: Results from the Linear Probability Model 
Variable Coef.  P-Value 
patents -0.162  (0.044) 
Patents
2 -0.022  (0.026) 
trademarks -0.077  (0.015) 
trademarks
2 0.033  (0.120) 
violations 1.483  (0.000) 
violations
2 -0.256  (0.004) 
gdp -0.098  (0.029) 
qcgov 0.141  (0.022) 
qcourt 0.114  (0.152) 
qparl -0.064  (0.471) 
manuf 0.065  (0.239) 
bigcomp 0.176  (0.000) 
statecomp 0.231  (0.024) 
monopolist -0.260  (0.058) 
stateown -0.142  (0.003) 
exports -0.036  (0.326) 
constant 0.141  (0.840) 
R2 0.079 
F-Stat 25.540  (0.000) 
Source: Own elaboration from WIPO and World Bank data. 
As the coefficient on a given variable can be interpreted as its marginal effect on the API, 
the sign and significance
22 of the marginal effects from the LPM are the same of the ones from 
the ordered probit model, pointing to the robustness of the result. 
Finally, Chart A4 presents the estimated coefficients from the unrestricted (with all 
control variables included) and restricted (excluding nonsignificant control variables) ordered 




                                                 
22 The P-Values reported on Chart A3 are taken from the comparison of a t-statistic with Student’s t distribution.  
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Chart A4: Results from the Linear Probability Model 
Unrestricted Model  Restricted Model  Variable 
Coef. (P-Value) Coef.  (P-Value) 
patents  -0,183 (0,034) -0,232 (0,004) 
Patents
2  -0,024 (0,023) -0,029 (0,005) 
trademarks  -0,069 (0,034) -0,071 (0,025) 
trademarks
2  0,034 (0,121) 0,028 (0,166) 
violations  1,660 (0,000) 1,810 (0,000) 
violations
2  -0,294 (0,001) -0,326 (0,000) 
gdp  -0,087 (0,050) -0,071 (0,098) 
qcgov  0,151 (0,015) 0,145 (0,000) 
qcourt  0,137 (0,089)       
qparl  -0,057 (0,519)       
manuf  0,061 (0,281)       
bigcomp  0,174 (0,000) 0,166 (0,000) 
statecomp  0,239 (0,023) 0,234 (0,026) 
monopolist  -0,309 (0,040) -0,317 (0,035) 
stateown  -0,142 (0,003) -0,145 (0,002) 
exports  -0,033 (0,384)       
α
1  2,165 2,262 
α
2  2,850 2,947 
α
3  3,531 3,627 
Log-Likelihood  -5739,122 -5741,454 
LR Test  363,33 (0,000) 358,66 (0,000) 
Source: Own elaboration from WIPO and World Bank data. 
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